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ABSTRACT
This article will assess both the problems and potential solutions to
contemporary seaborne threats of piracy, robbery, and terrorism, and
discuss challenges and opportunities for the domestic and interna-
tional forums prosecuting the crimes that constitute piracy and
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maritime terrorism. In particular it will begin with a discussion of the
(d)evolution of events in the late 20th Century, which has transformed
the old problem of piracy into a modern scourge. Piratical tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTP) gave rise to a distinctly different
threat from that faced in the past. Accompanying this discussion is a
survey of present-day piracy, followed by an analysis of why
piratical activities are more susceptible now than ever before to the
long arm of the law, especially, but not exclusively, domestic pro-
secution, as well as anti-piracy policies. The article will advance
reasons for why domestic, rather than international, prosecution will
be the prevailing remedy of choice when dealing with captured
pirates. Concluding comments will note why it is likely that present
and emergent anti-piracy activities will continue to expand across the
spectrum of operations, and summarize the challenges and
opportunities for the domestic and international forces preventing
piracy, those capturing pirates, and the fora prosecuting the crimes
that constitute piracy and maritime terrorism.
I. NEW TIMES, OLD PROBLEMS:
THE MODERN ERA OF MARITIME PIRACY
IPirates] are peculiarly obnoxious because they
maraud upon the open seas, the great highway of all
maritime nations. So heinous is the offence con-
sidered, so difficult are such offenders to apprehend,
and so universal is the interest in their prompt arrest
and punishment, that they have long been regarded
as outlaws and the enemies of all mankind.'
Piracy is only one of many elements of what I call
trans-national criminal activity because if [you are]
using the seaways for piracy, [they are] probably
being used for drug trafficking, human smuggling,
Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARv. L. REV. 334, 338
(1925).
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and arms smuggling. So, the way countries come
together and solve this is important.2
For thousands of years, piracy, or "robbery of the high seas," has
caused conflict in international waters. Increasingly, piracy has
become part of a multifaceted criminal or terrorist enterprise, espe-
cially in certain flashpoint locations around the globe. Contemporary
"attacks appear to be escalating in frequency, sophistication and
severity"in comparison to even the 200h Century's blight of piratical
activity.3 Piracy has thus become a highly organized business with
"professional" pirates, threatening the stability of the seas and their
surrounding nations. The increase in frequency of pirate attacks and
maritime conflicts causes a need for reassessment of the
countermeasures that have been implemented throughout history to
combat this problem. Typically, many countries who remain
involved in combating and preventing piracy tend to promote
military solutions and amendment to international laws. However,
placing emphasis on the domestication of criminalizing piracy will
eliminate many of the problems that arise out of conflicting laws,
sovereignty over criminals, and international boundaries.
The author Keith Johnson, in his 2010 work IWho's a Pirate?,-
mused on how it "may seem strange there should be doubt about an
offense as old as this one."4 "Piracy was the world's first crime with
universal jurisdiction, meaning that any country had the right to
apprehend pirates on the high seas."5 This jurisdiction was first
exercised by the Romans, who, in Johnson's estimation, took piracy
"so seriously [that] they overrode a cautious Senate and gave near-
dictatorial powers to an up-and-coming general named Pompey, who
soon swept away piracy in the Mediterranean." 61n the realm of one's
employment status bearing on legal status, history has been replete
2 United States Navy Quotes About Maritime Strategy, NAVY.MIL, http://www.navy.
mil/navydata/leadership/quotes.asp?q=253&c=6 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
3Frederick Chew, Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Regional Interests, GEDDES PAPERS
73, 73 (Austl. Command and Staff Coll. 2005), http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/
docs/publications20l0/PublcnsGeddes2005 310310 PiracyMaritime.pdf.
4 Keith Johnson, Who's a Pirate? US. Court Sees Duel Over Definition, WALL ST.
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with European countries such as Britain cracking "down on pirates -
except when busy enlisting certain ones, dubbed 'privateers,' to help
them fight their wars by raiding enemy ships."7 Johnson even
estimates that the creation of the modern U.S. Navy is attributable to
"Thomas Jefferson erupt[ing] over the cost of paying tribute to the
Barbary Corsairs for safe passage of U.S. merchant ships [when] [a]t
the time, the U.S. was paying about one-tenth of the federal budget to
the pirates." 8
There have traditionally been many relevant motivations that
drive piracy including economic hardship, lifestyle choices, and in
some cases social gain through organized crime. The ever-present
threat of maritime piracy demonstrates the clear need for an effective
international legal response to attacks on ships and developing the
appropriate mechanisms to bring malefactors to justice. However,
some piracy is also associated with political rebellion against their
governments such as the Somali pirates who claim nationalist
motives, or Nigerian pirates who claim to be rebelling against lost
tribal rights. As Professor John Winn and this author have previously
written, political motivation - or the lack thereof - appears to be a
major contributing factor to the continuing crisis of contemporary
piracy. 9 Both scholars have assessed the following incident as the first
major modern confluence of piracy and politics:
The modern era of maritime piracy, [hallmarked by
complex, multifaceted operations], arguably began at
2320 hours (11:30 pm) on September 19, 1992. On that
date, after a long period of relative inactivity, armed
criminals grappled aboard the Nagasaki Spirit, a
Liberian registered oil tanker, which was proceeding
south in the Malacca Strait between Sumatra and
Malaysia. After robbing the crew and looting the ship
stores, the gang forced the captain and crew over the
side before leaving the ship cruising at full speed on
7 id.
8Id.
John I. Winn & Kevin H. Govern, Maritime Pirates, Sea Robbers, and Terrorists:
New Approaches to Emerging Threats, 2 THE HOMELAND SEC. REV. 131, 132
(2008).
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autopilot in the most crowded shipping channel on
Earth. At the same time, on an opposite heading, the
container ship Ocean Blessing was also pilot-less with
its crew locked below decks after a similar attack. The
resulting collision and uncontrolled fires destroyed
both ships and killed all but two of the crew. Ocean
Blessing burned for six weeks spewing tons of heavy
oil into nearby Malaysian fisheries. To complicate
matters, the hulk of Ocean Blessing was towed by a
Chinese flagged tug to a breakers yard in India. Upon
arrival, however, suspicious customs investigators
discovered dozens of containers filled with the
charred remains of un-manifested Chinese-made
small arms and explosives destined for the Middle
East. Shortly afterwards, the owner of the breaker's
yard disappeared without a trace.10
The Ocean Blessing-Nagasaki Spirit incident illuminates the
complex nature of maritime piracy. "Since 1992, the threat to
maritime commerce has increased dramatically."" Maritime piracy
and sea robbery represent the most challenging current threat to
international maritime security. What is possibly the most disturbing
aspect of recent piracy "is the growing nexus between maritime
crime, terror organizations, and failed or failing states."12 Martin N.
Murphy has opined that piracy may be a "marginal problem in itself,
but the connections between organized piracy and wider criminal
networks and corruption on land make it an element of a
phenomenon that can have a weakening effect on states and a
destabilizing one on the regions in which it is found." 13 The emergent
threat appears to come not so much from "traditional commercial
10 Id.; see also Semco Salvage & Marine Pte. Ltd. v. Lancer Navigation Co., [1997]
A.C. 455 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
I Winn & Govern, supra note 9.
12 id
" David Osler, Book Review: Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism,
MARITIMETERRORISM.COM, http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/2007/08/19/book-
review-contemporary-piracy-and-maritime-terrorism/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2012)
(reviewing MARTIN N. MURPHY, CONTEMPORARY PIRACY AND MARITIME TER-
RORISM (2007)).
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pirates, but from a new breed of maritime terrorist, whose skills
evolve from a conventional piracy base[.]" 14 The value of dis-
tinguishing modern piracy as maritime terrorism may result in
government funds channeled into maritime security projects as a
form of law-enforcement. 15 In some instances, corrupt government
officials work directly with naval units to steal cargoes or even entire
ships or cargoes under the guise of "anti-smuggling" enforcement.16
Pirates and sea-robbers now range far out at sea in flotillas of small
boats supported by sophisticated "mother-ships" to opportunistically
attack vessels of almost any size.17 Maritime underwriters take the
threats seriously that "sea sport scooters, scuba diving equipment,
and mini-submarines" will be used in the near future to facilitate
maritime attacks.18
II. TALLYING ACTORS AND THEIR TERRIBLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
As Snodden has pointed out, there is a genuine dilemma of
how to distinguish who the principal actors are in these activities,
versus the accomplices and second or third-hand beneficiaries, where
sponsorship and/or identity are not apparent and actors have over-
come deterrence and evaded apprehension: " [H]ow would you know
that pirates attacking a ship are those motivated by political ideals
14 Aegis Maritime Terrorism Report - June 2004, AEGIS DEFENSE SERVICES LTD.,
http://www.aegisdef-webservices.com/june 2004_maritime terrorism rep.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2012).
15 Robert Snoddon, Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing




16 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report- Volume
1 Drug and Chemical Control (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2009/vol /index.htm (note especially country reports at pp. 106-627).
17 Mother Ship' Behind Pirate Raids, BBC NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4428808.stm (reporting that "[p]irate attacks off Somalia's
coast are being organised from command vessels, or 'mother ships,"' according to
the International Maritime Bureau).
" Graham Gerard Ong, Pre-empting Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,
VIEWPOINTS, 3, (Nov. 29, 2002), http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs//docs/Ong-
Preempting%20Terrorism%20and%20Piracy,%201SEAS.pdf.
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and are part of a group of extremists intent on causing an economic
downturn in the maritime markets?" 19 In its breakdown of first and
second order costs of maritime piracy, the One Earth Future Working
Group estimated in 2010 that piracy created a global expense of $7 to
12 billion per year:
Cost Factor Value (Dollars)
Ransoms: excess costs $176 million
Insurance Premiums $460 million to $3.2 billion
Re-Routing Ships $2.4 to $3 billion
Security Equipment $363 million to $2.5 billion
Naval Forces $2 billion
Prosecutions $31 million
Piracy Deterrent Organizations $19.5 million
Cost to Regional Economies $1.25 billion
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST $7 to $12 billion per year
Table 1 - 2010 Estimate of Total Cost of Piracy 20
Regarding those losses, the "Joint War Committee" repre-
senting the marine committees of both Lloyd's Market Association,
and representatives from London's insurance company underwriters
classified the Strait of Malacca in 2005 as a "war zone" for purposes
of indemnity coverage. 21 Despite an increase in piracy, the "war
zone" status was removed a year later - to the relief of shippers
paying insurance premiums-as a "testimony to the increased
security of the strait[.]" 22 Nevertheless, other locations such as Benin
19 Snodden, supra note 15.
20 Anna Bowden et al., The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy, ONE EARTH FUTURE
WORKING PAPER, 25 (Dec. 2010), http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/
files/documents old/The Economic Cost of Piracy Full Report.pdf.
21 David Pilla, London Market Committee Sees Threat of Terror from Piracy in Key
Shipping Lane, BEST'S REVIEW, Sept. 2005, at 9.
22 K.C. Vijayan, Malacca Strait Is Off War Risk List But Piracy Attacks Up Last
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have been added as emergent "war zones." 23 Elsewhere, particularly
in Asia, piratical attacks have tended to result in thefts of ship's cargo
with or without fraudulent re-flagging. 24 In such instances, crews are
often murdered to deter detection or prosecution. 25 Because of
limited ports and market infrastructures, seizures in African waters
typically involve demands for cash as a ransom, payment of which
inadvertently encourages the persistence of piracy from the
international community and causes the number of attacks to go up
consistently despite best efforts to curb this trend.26 Moreover, paying
the ransom can cause a slippery slope, in that publicizing the
capitulation to ransom demands will proliferate worldwide growth
in piracy. The piracy threat is so severe that the International
Maritime Board (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) broadcasts "piracy alerts" from a twenty-four manned Piracy
Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur, 27 and at least one law firm
informs its clients of daily vessel casualty and piracy risks.28
qfcrMgdnABaun9hOA81wnbTA&cad-rja; see also Newsbank Access World News,
Rec. No. 1136F1464F5AD8E0.
23 Jonathan Saul, Ship Insurers Add Benin to Risk List After Attacks, REUTERS (Aug.
8, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/idUSL6E7J51M420110808.
24 Catherine Zara Raymond, Maritime Security: The Singaporean Experience Draft,
INST. OF DEF. AND STRATEGIC STUDIES SINGAPORE, 5-6 (Dec. 2005), http:/
faculty.nps.edu/brutzman/InternationalMaritimeProtectionSymposium2005/speakers
/RaymondCatherineZara/Hawaii%/o20paper-%/o20final.pdf.
25 See id.at 6.
26 Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy Off the Coast of
Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.
27 SeeIMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COM. CRIME SERS., http://www.icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (Formed in 1992, the
PRC's role includes efforts to "raise awareness of piracy hotspots, detail specific
attacks and their consequences, and investigate incidents of piracy and armed
robbery at sea and in port." The PRC also "work[s] with national governments on a
range of initiatives to reduce and ultimately eradicate attacks against ships.).
28 Christoph M. Wahner, Daily Vessel Casualty, Piracy & News Report,
COUNTRYMAN & MCDANIEL, http://www.cargolaw.com/presentations-casualties.
php (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
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The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) was established in
October of 1992 following a series of violent pirate attacks,29 namely
but not exclusively the attack on the oil tanker Valiant Carrier. It has
served as an active correspondent for the international community of
the potential danger that piracy poses to the maritime industry. The
PRC is an international nongovernmental organization financed by
voluntary contributions from sixteen ship-owners associations and
maritime insurance companies. The center records and reports
incidents of maritime pirate attacks occurring globally.30 The IMB's
responsibilities and services range from being a primary point of
contact when captains or shipmasters suspect piratical activity or
attacks, to coordination with governmental law enforcement and
regional organizations to report and combat piracy. 31
By 2010, the IMB reported 445 acts of piracy and armed
robbery at sea, the fourth successive year that the numbers of
reported incidents have increased, with Somalia having "accounted
for 92% of kidnappings" and 49 of 53 vessels seized, as the "highest
[numbers the IMB's PRC has] ever seen[.]" 32 By the Fall of 2011,
piratical acts were on-track to hit a regrettable all-time high, as the
PRC reported that "[p]iracy on the world's seas had risen to record
levels, with Somali pirates behind 56% of the 352 attacks reported this
year, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) revealed [on October 18, 20111 in its latest
global piracy report."3 3 Meanwhile, the PRC encouragingly noted
"more Somali hijack attempts are being thwarted by strengthened
anti-piracy measures."34
29 Cindy Vallar, Combating Piracy, Modern Piracy, Part 5, PIRATES AND
PRIVATEERS, http://www.cindyvallar.com/modern5.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
30 See IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, supra note 27.
31 Id.
32 Hostage-taking At Sea Rises To Record Levels, Says IM1B, ICC COM. CRIME
SERVS. (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-
rises-to-record-levels-says-imb.
3 International Maritime Bureau, Press Release: Oct. 18, 2011, As World Piracy
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Table 2 - Global Maritime Pirate Attacks3 5
The slight 1.3% decline from 2010 to 2011 contrasts with
2010's 10.9% leap over 2009's attack statistics, which in turn came
after an 11.4% increase in piracy and armed robbery committed at sea
worldwide between 2007 and 2008.36 In the first two months of 2012
35 Donna Nincic, State Failure And The Re-emergence Of Maritime Piracy 2, Mar.
26-29, 2008, at 2 (49th Ann. Convention of the Int'l Stud. Ass'n, Presentation Paper,
Mar. 26-29, 2008), http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p mla apa research
citation/2/5/4/3/2/pages254325/p254325-1.php; Piracy Attacks in East and West
Africa dominate world report, ICC COM. CRIME SERVS. (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/995-piracy-attacks-in-east-and-west-africa-dominate-
world-report (providing data for 2011); Hostage-taking At Sea Rises To Record
Levels, Says IMB, supra note 32 (providing data for 2010); 2009 Worldwide Piracy
Figures Surpass 400, ICC COM. CRIME SERVS. (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option-corn content&view-article&id=385:2009-worldwide-
piracy-figures-surpass-400&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (providing data for 2008 and
2009).
36 But cf Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 2010,
ANNUAL REPORT (Int'l Mar. Org., London) Apr. 1, 2011, at 2, http://www.imo.org/
OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Monthly%20and%20annual%20piarcy%2
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alone, there have been sixty-two pirate attacks and six hijackings
worldwide, of which twenty-six of the attacks and four hijackings
have been off Somali waters, bring the total vessels held captive off
Somalia to twelve, and total hostages to 177.37 These statistics
unfortunately invalidated the IMB's sanguine assessment of national
and international antipiracy measures, such that it assessed a
"relative decline in pirate attacks worldwide," despite an increase in
Somali pirates' range and capabilities:
[a] total of 196 incidents around the world were
recorded by the IMB's 24 hour Piracy Reporting
Centre [for the first two quarters of 2010], compared
to 240 incidents in 2009. This includes 31 vessels
hijacked, 48 vessels fired upon and 70 vessels
boarded.
During this period, one crew member was
killed, 597 crew members were taken hostage and 16
were injured. The use of firearms including rocket
propelled [sic] grenades was particularly marked in
the waters off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
Attacks in this region and in the Red Sea represent
more than half of the incidents reported over the past
six months.
The coast of Somalia remains particularly
vulnerable with 100 pirate attacks in 2010, including
Oand%20armed%20robbery%20report/169 Annual2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 1MO
Report] (asserting a 20.4% increase in piracy between 2009 and 2010); Reports on
Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 2008, ANNUAL REPORT (Int'l Mar.
Org., London) Mar. 19, 2009, at 1, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/
PiracyArmedRobbery/Monthly%20and%20annual%20piarcy%20and%20armed%20
robbery %20report/ 133-Annual2008.pdf (asserting an 8.5% increase in piracy
between 2007 and 2008).
3 Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Issued Monthly
2012, INT'L MARI. ORG. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-
centre/piracynewsafigures. This included the incident in which two hostages were
killed and sixteen others freed on Feb. 28, 2012, when a Danish warship intercepted
a cargo vessel that had been hijacked by pirates off Somalia's coast. Denmark:
Pirates kill 2 hostages on hUacked vessel, USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 2012) http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-02-28/pirates-denmark-hostages-
killed/53282318/1.
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27 hijackings. The numbers of attacks [in 2010] have
decreased compared to 2009 in the most dangerous
maritime area of the world.38
The predominance of these attacks has occurred in the Gulf of
Aden and the remainder off of the Horn of Africa, with the Malacca
Straights and South China Sea a distant third.39 Ports have not been
immune, with over 112 separate attacks on ships berthed or in anchor
in port. Many of these attacks result in injury or death, with 11
crewmen killed, 32 crewmen injured, and 21 crewmembers missing.
More disturbing is that during 2008 assailants took a total of 889
crewmembers hostage and hijacked 49 vessels.40 The ICC Com-
mercial Crime Service's 2010 analysis of the 2009 IMB figures is even
more disturbing. During this time period, the IMB reported:
153 vessels were boarded, 49 vessels were hijacked, 84
attempted attacks and 120 vessels fired upon -
compared to 46 ships fired upon in 2008. A total of
1052 crew were taken hostage. Sixty eight [sic] crew
were injured in the various incidents and eight crew
killed. The level of violence towards the crew has
increased along with the number of crew injuries.4 '
Pirates Face New Resistance as Navies Strike Back, Says IMB, ICC COM. CRIME
SERVS. (July 15, 2010), http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option com content
&view-article&id=418:pirates-face-new-resistance-as-navies-strike-back-says-
imb&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.
39 2010 IMO Report, supra note 36, at annex 2 p.2 .
40 Somalia Confirmed As Piracy Capital, CNN (Jan. 16, 2009), http:/articles.
cnn.com/2009-01-16/world/pirates.year 1_piracy-reporting-center-crew-members-
pirate-infested-waters? s=PM:WORLD.
41 2009 Worldwide Piracy Figures Surpass 400, supra note 35. By Oct. 2011,
worldwide piracyfigures were on their way to setting a new record high:
Worldwide Incidents: Total Attacks Worldwide - 369; Total Hijackings Worldwide
- 36; Incidents Reported for Somalia: Total Incidents - 208; Total Hijackings - 24;
Total Hostages: 400; Total Killed - 15; Current vessels held by Somali pirates:
Vessels - 13; Hostages - 249. See Piracy News & Figures, ICC COM. CRIME SERVS.,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (last visited Mar.
3,2012).
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As was the case in 2009, most of the attacks occurred off of
the Somali Coast.
In recent years, there has been a demographic shift associated
with attack locales. In 2008, most of these attacks occurred off of the
Gulf of Aden, adjacent to clan-led Puntland; the IMB assesses that
"[p]irates from the Puntland region were believed responsible for 35
incidents of piracy in the first quarter of 2010, including nine
hijackings." 42 In 2009, there was a marked increase in attacks off of
the east coast of Somalia near Haradhere; an area that since the
Summer of 2010 has been controlled by the militant Islamist group
Hizbul Islam that "wants to establish Sharia law and order and put an
end to the pirate trade in the town[.]"43 The attacks have become
more sophisticated utilizing mother ships and occurring as far as
1,000 miles from the coast of Mogadishu, indicating that this type of
piracy is becoming better funded and more refined. In August 2011,
the IMB ranked piracy off the coast of West Africa to rival levels near
Somalia, with Nigeria and Benin being second in the world, only to
Somalia, for incidents of sea piracy in the world, dramatically
increasing the cost of shipping to and from Nigeria in a region where
the United States and other Western nations do not have substantial
antipiracy patrols to augment national efforts.44
Maritime piracy may even be an extension of armed
insurgency extending its operations beyond land borders into the sea.
ArabindaAcharya and Nadeeka P. Withana from Singapore have
identified the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as the
"pioneer in maritime terrorism with a state-of-the-art maritime
terrorist organization" known as the "Sea Tigers." 45Acharya and
42 Kerin Backhaus, Piracy In The Puntland Region of Somalia, OILPRICE (May 12,
2010), http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/Africa/Piracy-In-The-Puntland-Region-of-
Somalia.html.
43 Somali Islamist Insurgents Seize Pirate Haven, BBC NEWS, May 2, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8657060.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
44 Yinkalbukun, West Africa Piracy Threat Rising to Somali Level, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 12, 2011, Westlaw, File No. 8/12/11 APWORLD 00:04:17.
45 Hariharan Balakrishnan, Experts Opinions,SAVE RAM SETHU, (Mar. 22, 2008)
http://ramsethu.org/expert6.html. Balakrishnan's discussion of Arabinda Acharya &
Nadeeka Prashadani Withana's Presentation to the Centre for Security Analysis
International Symposium on Dec. 13-14, 2006 in Chennai, India. The LTTE is a
Tamil group of "8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants" and a core of 3,000 to 6,000
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Withana report that the "Sea Tigers" are capable of "infiltrating
harbours [sic] to lay mines, conducting reconnaissance operations
and recovering material from vessels that have been sunk."46 Their
tools of terrorism and piracy include mines improvised from
"everyday household objects such as rice cookers[,]" to sophisticated
free floating mines such as those found in Trincomalee harbor.4 7 One
unsuccessful mining operation led to the June 2006 arrests of Sea
Tigers laying mines off the shore of Wennappuwa. 48 The British
Broadcasting Service reported on March 22, 2008 that ten crew from a
Sri Lankan patrol boat went missing off the coast of Nayaru after
their vessel exploded upon striking a sea mine placed by the LTTE.49
The "Sea Tigers" have also used a commercial fleet as a seemingly
"legitimate commercial cover and a source of revenue" in order to
clandestinely transport weapons and narcotics to support its own
operations, along with other piratical and terrorist groups.50 Piratical
activity facilitates delivery of illegal weapons and explosives, allows
undocumented movement of cadres, and provides banking-free
anonymous cash from ransoms. Also, while maritime terror attacks
may lack some of the desired public theatre of urban attacks, terror
organizations clearly do appreciate the potential of using ships as
both instruments and facilitators of terror. The U.S. Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has observed that while the
trained fighters that use "overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons,
and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state" in Sri Lanka. See
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Description, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS
INTELLIGENCE RES. PROGRAM (May 21, 2004), http://www.fas.org/ irp/world/
para/1tte.htm.
46 Balakrishnan, supra note 45.
47 Id
48 Id
49 Ten Missing After Ssic] Lanka Sinking, BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2008, http:/
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/7309200.stm.
50 B. Raman, Action Against LTTE's Maritime Terrorism, International Terrorism
Monitor: Paper No.58, INDIA DEF. CONSULTANTS (May 26, 2006) http://www.
indiadefence.com/LTTEnavy.htm (records that the Indian Navy confirmed at least
one instance in 1995 when an LTTE ship had "clandestinely transported a
consignment of arms and ammunition, dispatched by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
(HUM) of Pakistan to the southern Philippines for use by the Abu Sayyaf. The HUM
paid the LTTE for its services by donating to it some anti-aircraft weapons and
ammunition. This was in addition to the cash paid for [the services].")
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September 11th attacks involved airplanes as bombs, "it would not
take much of a leap to show that a ship could become the bomb,
particularly a ship with volatile cargo." 51Most disturbing is the
potential for these groups to create catastrophic disruptions to
regional or worldwide markets, especially for petroleum and
liquefied natural gas (LNG) products.
Less than a year after the September 11th attacks, Greek
authorities intercepted the Baltic Sky, a Comoros flagged ship
carrying an unprecedented 750 tons of high explosives.52 This
represents the amount of explosives the allies dropped on the
German V-1 rocket assembly sites in World War II.53 When
intercepted, it was discovered that the Baltic Sky was destined for
Sudan with a cargo consigned to a private company using a post-
office box in Khartoum.54 In October 2002, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a
senior Al Qaeda operative in Yemen, was credited with the suicide
attack of the French super-tanker MV Liniburg in the Red Sea.55 The
next year, the Abu Sayef group took credit for an attack on a
passenger ferry in Manila that killed over 100 passengers and crew.56
More recent piracy attacks include the highly publicized April 8, 2009
5 Press Release, TV Worldwide.com, Port Debate Heightens Calls For More U.S.
Crews On Ships As Security Measure (Sept. 14, 2004), http:/www.
tvworldwide.com/events/maritimetv/ us maritime-expo/player.cfm.
52 Greeks Stop Explosives-Laden Ship, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/23/world/main559855.shtml
5 Adam L. Gruen, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II
PREEMPTIVE DEFENSE ALLIED AIR POWER VERSUS HITLER'S V-WEAPONS, 1943-
1945 32 (1998) (The U.S. Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy attacked the V-weapon
manufacturing plant at Ober Raderach in southern Germany with more than 750 tons
of bombs.).
54 Patrick Quinn, Greeks Probe Possible Terror Links To Seized Ship Loaded With
Explosives, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 24, 2003, Westlaw, File No. 6/24/03
APWORLD 00:00:00.
5 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, Biographies of High Value Terrorist
Detainees Transferred to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay 7 (Sept. 6, 2006),
http://www.dni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf.
56 Carlos H. Conde, 4 Suspects Arrested in Philippine Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11 /world/asia/1 liht-phils.html.
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hijacking of the Maersk Alabama off the coast of Somalia,57 and the
attack on the U.S.-flagged Liberty Sun on April 14, 2009,58 showing
that this international threat of piracy is continuous and must be
addressed. How the world community is responding to this menace
is predicated on the interpretation and enforcement of the assortment
of international treaties, international and common law attributes,
and adjacent State regulation, code and law. According to Honorable
William D. Delahunt, speaking before the House Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight in April
2009, "[pliracy will present a particularly difficult task because it is
not only an American problem-but an international problem that
will need a coordinated response from the world community." 59
A BBC report in 2008 estimated that the total payout to
pirates that year exceeded $150 million, making piracy quite a
lucrative enterprise.60 Even more disturbing is the inability of
powerful nations to control the occurrences of piracy. By August
2010, "at least 22 foreign vessels plus one barge [were] kept in Somali
hands against the will of their owners, while at least 401seafarers-
including an elderly British yachting couple-plus the lorry drivers
from Somaliland" were being detained.61 In January 2011, the 320
5 Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates; Navy Ship
Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/world/
africa/09pirates.html.
Martha Raddatz, Kirit Radia & Lee Ferran, American Ship Survives Somali
Pirates HUack Attempt, ABC NEWS, Apr. 14, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/
International/story?id=7331134&page=1.
59 International Efforts to Combat Aaritime Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th
Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Int'l Orgs., Human Rights and Oversight).
60 Robyn Hunter, How Do You Pay a Pirate's Ransom?, BBC NEWS, Dec. 3, 2008,
http: //news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/77528 13.stm. The BBC report further
stated that "Roger Middleton, a Horn of Africa specialist at the Chatham House, says
the ship-owners hire professionals, from specialist negotiators to private security
firms, to transfer the ransoms." Id
61 Status of Seized Vessels and Crews in Somalia, The Gulf of Aden and the Indian
Ocean,THE INT'L NEWS MAG., (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.international.to/
index.php?option com content&view article&id=548:-status-of-seized-vessels-
and-crews-in-somalia-the-gulf-of-aden-and-the-indian-ocean-ecoterra- 12-august-
2010-&catid=36:news&Itemid=74. Notably, a British couple hijacked while sailing
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elderly passengers aboard the Spirit ofAdventure had the unexpected
adventure of coming under attack by Somali pirates, while at the
same time some forty other ships came into pirates' hands and more
than 800 crew were being held captive in the seas south of the Gulf of
Aden. 62 The STRATFOR Global Intelligence organization assessed in
January 2011, that " [als long as these pirates have safe-havens along
Somalia's coast, they will be able to replace men, weapons and
vessels lost at sea to foreign naval forces-and will continue
collecting ransom payments ranging as high as $10 million."63
A "perfect storm" of increasing maritime vulnerability and
pirate capability threatens maritime underpinnings of international
trade, peace, and security. Failed, corrupt, or indifferent states ignore
obligations to cooperate with other states to repress piratical acti-
vity.64 Access to weapons and technologies, including global
positioning systems (GPS) and marine satellite (MARSAT)
communications, can allow pirates to venture forth with impunity.
Weak maritime registration regimes also allow stolen vessels to be re-
registered at sea, and crews carrying false passports, forged
competency certificates, and fraudulent bills of lading are able to man
stolen ships. Maritime documents were discovered to be fraudulent
or questionable in some locations, according to the IMO as well as
press sources.65 The IMO report notes that issuers of fraudulent
documents are "'well-organised [sic], with effective links to maritime
administrations, employers, manning agents and training establish-
ments."' 66 Port officials and customs agents may also collude with
a private yacht to Tanzania in October 2009 were still being held hostage by Somali
pirates in the coastal town of Hobyo for a demanded $7 million ransom for their
release.
62 Michael Nicholson, Spirit of Adventure: Behind the Rise of the Somali Pirates,
THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/
8298095/Spirit-of-Adventure-Behind-the-rise-of-the-Somali-pirates.html.
63 The Somali Pirates Are Getting Smarter and More Aggressive, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-somali-pirates-are-getting-
smarter-and-more-aggressive-20 11-1.
64 United Nations Convention on the High Seas art. 14-15, Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 90; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) art.100-
101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 436 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
65 Eric Watkins, Shipping Fraud Heightens Terror Threat, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1804146.stm.
66 id.
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organized criminal groups to identify and track potential target
ships; they work together to prevent recovery of ships and cargoes or
the prosecution of offenders.67 Billions of dollars are lost to piracy
and maritime predation each year, yet most incidents go
unreported.68 Owners clearly wish to avoid protracted, futile, or
corrupt investigations, negative publicity, or increased underwriting
costs that may exceed the amount of the loss itself.69
Prior to the late 20th Century, threats to maritime security
"were either political or military in nature" and normally resolved
through diplomacy or conflict.70 In that century, pirates escaped
detection by navigating at high speed, ignoring international
boundaries, and taking advantage of safe havens in their own or
foreign coastal waters. Areas most affected by piracy and maritime
criminality also typically lack bilateral or multilateral understandings
with neighbors.71 National self-interest (and corruption) fosters a lack
of commitment to address maritime theft and violence. Economically
challenged maritime states with limited littoral ("brown water") and
deep water ("blue water") naval capabilities are often reluctant to
spend their limited fiscal resources to benefit primarily foreign
67 Examining The Links Between Organised Crime And Corruption, CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF DEMOCRACY (Apr. 2010), http://kmsl.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/
ISN/132594/ipublicationdocument singledocument/5d40e029-9b44-4b00-bf4O-
92690cef3714/en/OrganizedCrimeo26Corruption.pdf (example of Greece at pp.
238-241 where several members or whole departments of state administrative
bodies, to include police and port customs officials, members of the judiciary, and
politicians have colluded with organized crime groups by engaging in what is termed
"systemic" or "organised corruption.").
68 Bowden et al., supra note 20, at 25.
See Anna Hopper, Squashing the Skull and Bones: Reforming the International
Anti-Piracy Regime, HARV. INT'L REV., Winter 2008, at 28, 30 (asserting that
barriers to reporting contribute to less-than-complete data on piracy).
70 Vijay Sakhuja, Maritime Order & Piracy, 24 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 923, 923
(2000). For a fascinating examination of 19 th Century Anglo-U.S. policy and treaties
that equated the slave trade to piracy; see Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and
the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L. J. 550, 604, 607, 625
(2008) (discussing the role and establishment of antislavery courts).
7 Lauren Ploch et al., Piracy Off the Horn of Africa, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
R40528 (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf (As noted on
page 3 of the report, "[p]irates tend to operate in regions with large coastal areas,
high levels of commercial activity, small national naval forces, and weak regional
security cooperation mechanisms.").
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commercial interests. When regional and sub-regional diplomatic
meetings do occur, they typically yield no more than pledges of
cooperation or information sharing, often because of the inability of
some nations to support an anti-piracy initiative. Regional states,
particularly in Asia, remain especially sensitive to issues of
sovereignty, but are increasingly willing to discuss and pursue
serious counter-piracy regimes, including ones involving cooperation
with the U.S.72
Maritime pirates, sea-robbers, and sea-terrorists present a
daunting set of legal, political, and practical challenges, including the
task of patrolling 2.5 million square miles of sea to prevent such
attacks in the pirate plagued country of Somalia alone.73
Nevertheless, in an age of diminishing resources and burgeoning
demand for manufactured products and raw materials, mitigating
the maritime piracy threat is critical. The threat posed by pirates and
72 Ralph A. Cossa et. al., The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security
Strategy for the Obama Administration, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNA-
TIONAL STUDIES (CSIS) REPORT (Feb. 2009), http://csis.org/files/
media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights v09nOl.pdf (As noted on page 69 of the CSIS report,
"[m]ore concretely, the littoral states of Southeast Asia should step up efforts to
secure sea lines of communication and prevent piracy."). The Djibouti Code of
Conduct is also noteworthy regarding antipiracy measures in this region. SeeDjibouti
Code of Conduct, INT'L MAR. ORG. (2011), http://www.imo.org/OurWork/
Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx. Signatories promote cooperation to fight against
piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Id In conformity with
local and international laws, nations under this initiative will set up inquiries, arrests
and prosecution of persons suspected to have committed piracy acts and armed
attacks against ships, as well as the interdiction and seizure of suspected vessels and
their cargo, the medical treatment and repatriation of sailors, fishermen and onboard
personnel and other passengers. Id Representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and
Yemen signed on Jan. 29, 2009, and Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have since signed making
the current total eighteen countries from the twenty-one eligible to sign the Djibouti
Code of Conduct. Id. It remains open for signature at IMO Headquarters by other
countries in the region. Id
International Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy, supra note 59, at 20 (statement
of Rear Admiral William Baumgartner on behalf of the U.S. Coast Guard); see also
U.S.NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL,COUNTERING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA:
PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN, (2008), at 5, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/
Countering PiracyOff The Horn of Africa - Partnership Action Plan.pdf.
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sea robbers will increase dramatically in scope and violence into the
foreseeable future without global commitment, cooperation, and
engagement. Piracy undermines global international market systems
and is symptomatic of failed, weak, and corrupt states. In turn, weak
and failed states are most associated with other maritime crime,
including illegal fishing, drug and arms smuggling, illegal migration,
pollution, and terrorism.
III. LOOKING FROM DISTANT SHORES CLOSER To HOME:
LAW AND POLICY TO COMBAT PIRACY
Under customary international law, piracy included every
unauthorized act of violence committed by a private vessel on the
open sea against another vessel with intent to plunder.74 Prior to the
19th century, captured pirates were hosteshumana generis (enemies of
mankind) and subject to summary justice (including capital
punishment) "without any [s]olemnity of [c]ondemnation, by the
[m]arine [l]aw."75 By the mid 20th Century, several important
international conventions had already been developed, including the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1948
(SOLAS), 76 the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 1954 (MARPOL),77 and treaties dealing
with the prevention of collisions at sea.78 The United Nations
International Maritime Organization (IMO) came into existence in
1958.79 Responsibilities of the IMO include adopting, implementing,
and amending conventions that facilitate international maritime
74 See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 608-609 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
75 Jonathan M. Gutoff, The Law of Piracy in Popular Culture, 3 I. OF MAR. LAW &
COM. 643, 646-47 (2000) (quoting G. JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at "Pirates"
(8th ed. 1762)).
76 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, 32
U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter SOLAS]. This treaty was motivated in
large part by the Titanic disaster of 1912.
77 See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
(MARPOL), May 12, 1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
78 See International Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, 640 U.N.T.S. 133; see
also Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
Oct. 20, 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16.
79 Brief History of IMO, U.N. INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/
HistoryOflMO/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
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safety, efficiency in navigation and prevention of marine pollution
from ships.8 0
One important agency that emerged was the Maritime Law
Association of the United States (USMLA), which formed the
Committee on the International Law of the Sea to review and study
the existing international laws that dealt with maritime piracy. In
November of 1997, the USMLA made recommendations to the
Comit6 Maritime International (CMI) that it should, in concert with
the United Nations and IMB, form a working group that would be
charged with developing a model national law concerning maritime
piracy.81 This same group lobbied Congress to review U.S. piracy
law, but there was little interest shown by Capitol Hill until after the
9/11 tragedy.82
In 1998, the CMI formulated a Joint International Working
Group on Uniformity of Law Concerning Acts of Piracy and
Maritime Violence (JIWG), comprised of maritime transportation
representatives, trade councils, international law enforcement
agencies, and the ICC-IMB. 83 The JIWG identified that the
fundamental difficulty in obtaining effective measures of suppression
was a lack of uniformity in national laws concerning piracy and acts
of maritime violence as well as the reporting and investigation of
80 Id.
See generally George D. Gabel, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines
as an International Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REv. 1433, 1446-47
(2006).
82 Id. at 1447, 1450-51.
81 Letter from Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., Chairman of the JIWG 1-3 (May 2005),
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/pdf/Acts PiracyWP.pdf. (At its May 2005
meeting, the Executive Council approved the establishment of the Joint International
Working Group, including representatives of the following participants in addition to
the CMI: the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO); the International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS); the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL); the International Group of P & I Clubs (IGP & I); the ICC
International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB); the International Maritime Organization
(IMO); the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF); and the International
Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI). Those in attendance gave preliminary considera-
tion to amendment and re-formulation of the Model National Law. Contact was also
made with the Director of the Legal Bureau of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and the Director of the Legal Department of the International
Air Transport Association (IATA).).
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incidents.84 The group set out to formulate a Model National Law
Code dealing with piracy, especially with regards to jurisdiction and
prosecution of piracy and maritime violence.85 The JIWG previously
produced a Model National Law that the Assembly of the CMI
adopted in Singapore in February 2001.86 The increasing frequency of
hostage taking in connection with acts of piracy and maritime caused
the CMI to consider whether the Model National Law should be
"amended or re-formulated to attract wider implementation and to
resolve issues of jurisdiction and prosecution of a broader range of
criminal offences committed on board foreign-flag ships, some of
which offences may have implications for maritime security." 87
Any successfully implemented and universally adopted
Model National Law ought to harmonize with the 1982 UNCLOS and
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) articles, and any "coalition of
the willing"88 that combats piracy must have common diplomatic
and political philosophies that include proactive cooperation, not
condonation or tolerance of piracy,89 and a "common vocabulary"
with respect to defining, preventing, and prosecuting maritime
piracy, terrorism, and other related acts of violence.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) codifies piracy to constitute the following:
84 Id. at 5.
85 Id.
86 Letter from Jean Serge Rohart, President of the CMI 1 (May 19, 2005),
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/pdf/Acts PiracyWP.pdf.
8 Wiswall, supra note 83, at 2.
88 See Interview with Sam Donaldson of ABC News, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1035, 1035
(June 5, 1994); Exchange with Reporters in Crawford, Texas, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2215,
2217 (Dec. 31 2002). Note: The origin of the term "coalition of the willing" is
uncertain, but as a post-1990 political phrase, President Bill Clinton used it in June
1994, in relation to possible operations against North Korea, and President George
W. Bush in the intervention of Iraq in 2003.
See, e.g, David Osler, ICS Demands Unified Anti-piracy Effort, inCurrent
Awareness Bulletin, Mar. KNOWLEDGE CTR. (Int'l Mar. Organ., London), Jan.,
2010, at 14, http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/CurrentAwarenessBulletin/
Documents/CAB%/o20159%/o20January%/o202010.pdf
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Article 101
Definition of piracy
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft,
or against persons or property on board such ship
or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Article 102
Piracy by a warship, government ship or government
aircraft whose crew has mutinied
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed
by a warship, government ship or government
aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of
the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed
by a private ship or aircraft.
Article 103
Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft
if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to
be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts
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referred to in article 101. The same applies if the ship
or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so
long as it remains under the control of the persons
guilty of that act.90
Armed robbery against ships is defined in the draft Code of Practice
for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships (resolution A.922 (22), Annex, paragraph 2.2) as
follows:
[airmed robbery against ships means any unlawful
act of violence or detention or any act of depredation,
or threat thereof, other than an act of "piracy",
directed against a ship or against persons or property
on board such ship, within a State's jurisdiction over
such offences.91
For statistical purposes, the IMB defines piracy and armed robbery
as:
[a]n act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with
the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and
with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act. This definition thus covers
actual or attempted attacks whether the ship is
berthed, at anchor or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded,
unless the thieves are armed. 92
90 UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 101-103.
91 See Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, THIRD QUAR-
TERLY REPORT (Int'l Mar. Org., London)Dec. 7, 2007, at 1, http://www.imo.org/
includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id=20879/110.pdf.
92 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, ANNUAL REPORT (ICC Int'l Mar.
Bureau, London) Jan. 2011, at 1, http://www.simsl.com/Downloads/Piracy/ IMB
PiracyReport2010.pdf. For a superb compilation of law and policy on piracy and
armed robbery at sea, see Information Resources on Piracy and Armed Robbery at
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Any state may invoke extraordinary jurisdiction to arrest or detain
persons or vessels on the high seas involved in piracy. 93 Violence or
other criminal acts committed for political ends (i.e. terrorism) under
UNCLOS is not piracy. 94 Also un-encompassed by UNCLOS are
planned crimes committed by stowaways, even on the high seas, and
"outside of mutiny any unlawful acts of violence by a government
vessel against another craft are a matter of State responsibility, not
the law of piracy.9 5 Debate continues as to whether UNCLOS
addresses what amounts to a large amount of all maritime attacks
against ships and crew; that is, those vessels attacked or stolen when
moored in ports, harbors, or other territorial waters. 96 Continued
discussion also covers whether the definitions of piracy adequately
encompass the needs of the modern era and exactly which acts are
considered to be illegal. Acts falling outside of UNCLOS's narrow
definition are usually referred to as "sea robbery," "piratical acts," or
occasionally as "modern piracy." 97
93 See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 26.
94 Letter from Int'l Mar. Org., to All IMO Member States, United Nations and
specialized agencies, Intergovernmental orgs., Non-governmental org. in consulta-
tive status, and Liberation movements, 3 (May 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/
depts/los/piracy/circular letter 3180.pdf ("Pursuant to article 101 of UNCLOS, an
act of piracy requires that it be committed for private ends, such as extracting a
ransom. Acts that are politically motivated, i.e. done with the objective of
intimidating a population or of compelling a Government or an international
organization to do, or to abstain from doing any act, will not be acts of piracy.").
9 frica Programme and International Law Conference Report - Piracy and Legal
Issues: Reconciling Public and Private Interests, CHATHAM HOUSE CONFERENCE
REPORT, 28 (OCT. 1, 2009), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/Africa/0 1009piracylaw.pdf.
96 See Tamara R. Shie, Ports in a Storm? The NVexus Between Counterterrorism,
Counterproliferation, and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, PACIFIC FORUM
CSIS, Jul. 2004, at 17, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights
v04nO4.pdf. Shie notes that the debate concerns whether "attacks are those which
only occur on the high seas, as in the traditional definition imposed by UNCLOS
(though in 2001 the IMO expanded the definition to include attacks in territorial
waters), or if attacks to vessels in port are also included, as they are in the definition
employed by the International Maritime Bureau."
97 See generally Silvia C. Galleti, Old and New Threats: Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, (2006).
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Within the meaning and effect of UNCLOS international
piracy, or piracy jure gentium,98 remains sui generis, or of a class of its
own, because of the truly unique jurisdictional complexities
associated with international maritime crime. Courts often have
difficulty determining whether the criminal law in question applies
to the place where the alleged offense occurred and whether the court
in question has jurisdiction to try the case.
Following the 1985 terror-hijacking of the Italian cruise ship
Achille Lauro, and recognizing the severe shortcomings within
UNCLOS, 99 the U.S. was instrumental in advancing and
promulgating the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) under the
auspices of the United Nations IMB. 100 The SUA, which formally
entered into effect in 1998, partially fills a jurisdictional gap in
UNCLOS. Article 3(1) invokes a universal obligation of states to
either punish or to extradite any person that commits an offense (yet
not using the words "piracy") if that person unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or
threat thereof or any other form of intimidation;
or
98 See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 258 (7th ed. 1996) (piracy jure
gentium means "piracy under international law.").
99 Convention for the Suppression of Unlavful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES
1, (May 15, 2010) http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/maritime.pdf. The IMO's
official commentary noted that "[c]oncern about unlawful acts that threaten the
safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews grew during the 1980s
motivated states to negotiate and subsequently adopt this convention . . . . [After] the
1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution
40/61 in 1985, urging States to cooperate in contributing to the elimination of causes
underlying terrorism and invited the IMO to study the problem of terrorism aboard
or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures."
00 SUA Treaties, U.N. INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/
ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (The official
commentary by the IMO notes that "[i]n November 1985 the problem was con-
sidered by IMO's 14th Assembly and a proposal by the United States that measures
to prevent such unlawful acts should be developed by IMO was supported.").
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(b) performs an act of violence against a person on
board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to
its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is
likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to
that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely
to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navi-
gational facilities or seriously interferes with their
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be
false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a
ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the
commission or the attempted commission of any
of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to
(f).101
Unlike UNCLOS, SUA encompasses criminal actions
committed in ports, coastal zones, or territorial waters.102 SUA makes
no distinction between commercial or political motives.10 3 Although
the SUA definition of piracy is a substantial improvement over that
found in UNCLOS, critics note that it does not encompass extortion
or conspiracies by port officials, even if part of a piratical enter-
101 The SUA also covers inchoate (incomplete) acts, including attempts, abetting,
acting as an accomplice, and threatening with or without a condition. Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawfnl [sic] Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
art.3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201.
102 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, ANNUAL REPORT (ICC Int'l Mar.
Bureau, London) Jan. 2011, at 1, available at http://www.simsl.com/
Downloads/Piracy/IMBPiracyReport2OlO.pdf
103 See Dana Dillon, Maritime Piracy: Defining the Problem, 25 SAIS REV. 155,
156-57 (2005).
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prise. 104 SUA also suffers from jurisdictional limitations. Once a
lawful boarding has taken place (with the permission of the flag
state), Article 6 of the SUA does not provide for any independent or
prescriptive jurisdiction.105 SUA likewise denies the capturing state
the right to prosecute offenders without permission of the flag
state.106
However, the 2005 Protocols to SUA did include, by reference
to other treaties, as unlawful acts: 1) actions aimed to intimidate a
population, government or international agency to take action or
abstain from taking action; 2) actions against or on ships by utilizing
or discharging biological or chemical weapons (BCN) or weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) or transporting the same; 3) using or
discharging oil, LNG, or other hazardous substances in such quantity
to cause injury or death; 4) using a ship as a weapon; and/or 5)
transporting or utilizing software or technology that contributes to
the design, manufacturer or delivery of a BCN weapon.107 However,
there is significant confusion over Article 3 of the 2005 Protocol with
regard to what constitutes persons "acting unlawfully and
intentionally" with respect to "seizure of ships by force[,] acts of
violence against persons on board ships[,] and the placing of devices
on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it."108
Does this Protocol refer to unlawful acts under international
or national law, or both? Also, like SUA, the 2005 Protocols only bind
contracting states that are a party to it. Thus far, the U.S. and 157
other nations are contracting states with respect to the 1988
104 Africa Programme, supra note 95.
1os See Summary of Discussion, International Law Discussion Group at Chatham
House, Ship-Boarding: An Effective Measure Against Terrorism and WMD
Proliferation? 3 (Nov. 24, 2005), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/International%/o20Law/ilp241105.doc [hereinafter Chatham House].
06 Id. at 2.
107 Protocol of 2005 To the Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art 3bis, Nov. 1, 2005, available at
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Protocol 2005 ConventionMaritime navigation.
pdf.
08 SUA Treaties, supra note 100 ("The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention also
adds a new Article 3bis which states that a person commits an offence within the
meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally" committed
certain enumerated acts relating to "explosive, radioactive material or BCN
(biological, chemical, nuclear) weapons.").
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Convention.109 The U.S and 145 other nations have ratified the 1988
Protocol. 110 Only seventeen nations, however, have ratified the 2005
Protocols."' Most distressing, some of the maritime states most
affected by, or involved with, piracy are non-signatories to SUA, its
protocols or none of the related instruments at the time of this
writing.112
Furthermore, jurisdictional gaps in UNCLOS or SUA could
be filled by invocation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute rendering
jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute
persons who engage in terroristic attacks at sea.113 Unfortunately, in
addition to the delay and controversy apparently intrinsic to
invocation of ICC jurisdiction, none of the littoral states, those closest
to the seas and most affected by-or associated with-piratical
activity, are contracting states to the Rome Statute.114 Even if these




" Id On Sept. 25, 2008 the U.S. Senate resolved, with 2/3 of the Senators present
concurring therein, to advise and consented to the ratification of the 2005 SUA
Protocol (in a reservation, it declared "that it does not consider itself bound by
Article 16(2) of the Convention with respect to disputes concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the 2005 SUA Protocol." A lengthy list of
"understandings" also accompanied the Senate ratification of the 2005 SUA
Protocol.). See S. Exec. Rep. 110-25, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2008), https://docs.
google.com/viewer?a-v&q cache:XR7D6pArasoJ:www.foreign.senate.gov/downlo
ad/?id%3D906EAF6F-7CDD-4124-99E6-FBB6FD3AE2D 1 +&hl en&gl us&pid=




112 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Short Ratification Status (Sept. 15, 2011),
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/ratification status no access.rtf. Bangladesh,
China, India, and the Philippines have ratified the SUA 1988 and SUA 1988
Protocol, but not the SUA 2005 Protocols. Sri Lanka and Nigeria have ratified only
the SUA 1988; Indonesia, Malaysia, Somalia and Thailand have ratified none of the
SUA treaties or protocols.
113 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, opened for signature July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 93-94 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
114 Considering the same states as identified in Endnote 112, Nigeria has, in fairness,
both signed and ratified the Rome Statute. Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand
have signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri
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states were to ratify the Rome Statute, the U.S. remains a significant
(and disappointing) non-party state to the Rome Statute.115
This is because the Rome Statute remains far from ideal.
Jurisdiction under the ICC is entirely discretionary and sanctions are
not available against states that ignore treaty obligations. Also, Rome
does not create universal jurisdiction under customary international
law norms (jus cogens).116 Jurisdiction is limited to instances in which
perpetrators or victims are nationals of a state party to the Statute.117
Even then, jurisdiction attaches only if the criminal act in question
takes place in a state party's territorial waters or aboard a vessel
flagged by that state.118 This leaves out the ability to prosecute
arrested pirates whose crimes occurred in international waters and
whose nationality is other than those involved because of the lack of
international criminal jurisdiction based on the national laws of that
maritime territory. Other problems arise when arrested pirates are
extradited into third countries to be prosecuted. This is because the
establishment of universal jurisdiction in cases of extradition would
Lanka and Somalia have neither signed or ratified the Rome Statute. See U.N.
Secretary-General, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
(April 2011), http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2011 /Treaties/list english.pdf.
115 The U.S. gave notice of same to the Secretary General on May 6, 2002, stating:
"This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to
become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations
arising from its signature on Dec. 31, 2000. The United States requests that its
intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the
depositary's status lists relating to this treaty." See United States (U.S.): Letter to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations Regarding the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (April 27, 2002), ininternational Law in Brief, AM.
SOC'Y OF INT'L L. (May 9, 2002), http://www.asil.org/ilib05O6.cfm#r3.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SOURCES OF INT'L LAW
§102 (1987).
117 See Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 12. But see The Tribunal,
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, http://www. itlos.org/
index.php?id=15 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (The International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (The Tribunal) is an independent judicial body established by the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Tribunal has
jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, and over all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement
which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal).
118 Rome Statute, supra note 113, at art. 12.
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be against the terms of the UNCLOS treaty, which states that
punishment must be carried out by "the courts of the state which
carried out the seizure ..... "119
As a result of the vast area that is plagued by piracy,
international maritime laws struggle to amend these issues because
of uncertainties over jurisdictions and legal definitions, among many
other factors. By default, or out of a lack of extant, let alone effective
forum for international prosecution of piracy, nation-states are often
left to trying insurgents, rogue military units, organized crime
syndicates, terrorist and terrorist-sponsored groups (a/k/a "pirates")
domestically. 120
During the first half of 2011, piracy attacks in the Indian
Ocean increased by 36%,121 yet as immigration law expert Jason
Dzubow notes that prosecution of captured pirates remains relatively
rare: "in fact, four-fifths of captured pirates are released without
further ado." 122
The One Earth Future Working Paper estimated that the cost
of piracy prosecutions in 2010 alone was around $31 million,
obtained by estimating "the cost of piracy prosecutions each year by
multiplying the average cost of criminal prosecutions in 'regional'
nations (i.e. Kenya, the Seychelles, and Yemen), North America, and
Europe, by the number of prosecutions occurring in each of those
respective regions[.]"123 Surveying the nations involved in Somali
pirate prosecutions over the past two years, Jurist Legal News and
Research notes that Germany, Kenya, the Seychelles, South Korea,
119 UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 105.
120 This article does not discuss aircraft piracy (a/k/a "skyjacking") committed by
various state and non-state actors, nor does it address cyber-piracy, such as that
experienced by the U.S. during the late 1980s onward from actors within China.
Professor Peter K. Yu has written about U.S.-China intellectual property disputes
and the eventual, yet partial, resolution via intellectual property agreements in 1992,
1995, and 1996. Despite these agreements, Yu concluded in 2000 that intellectual
property piracy remains rampant in China. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates To
Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property In China In The Twventy-First Century, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 131, 133 (2000).
121 Jason Dzubow, Pirates Taken to USA for Prosecution Might Seek Asylum,
MARITIME SECURITY.ASIA (July 19, 2011), http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-
2/piracy-update/pirates-taken-to-the-usa-for-prosecution-might-seek-asylum/.
122 Id.
123 Bowden et al., supra note 20, at 19.
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Somaliland, Spain, Malaysia, Mauritius, the Netherlands, and, Yemen
have all attempted to prosecute suspected pirates, with varying
degrees of success in conviction.124 Yet the de-facto Somali
government reaction (given the lack of a de jure government) has
been critical of the U.S. in particular for exercising jurisdiction over
suspected Somali pirates and has called for piracy cases to be
handled by an international tribunal.125
At the time of this article's writing, four piracy prosecutions
in the U.S. had become the first successful prosecutions of piracy in a
U.S. court since the 1820s. On November 24, 2010 five Somali men
were convicted of attacking the U.S. Navy ship USS Nichols off the
eastern coast of Africa.126 In January 2011, the attorneys for the
convicted pirates made a request for the sentencing judge to
reconsider their conviction on charges of piracy, attacking to plunder
a maritime vessel and assault with a dangerous weapon.127 On
November 29, 2010 a judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia sentenced Somali citizen Jama Idle Ibrahim to 30
years pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit piracy
under the law of nations and conspiracy to use a firearm during and
in relation to a violent act of piracy in the Gulf of Aden against a
124 Dan Taglioli, Somali Man Indicted In U.S. As Alleged Pirate Leader, JURIST
(April 14, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/index 2011 04 14.php. For a
survey of these prosecutions, see, e.g., pirates, search the JuRusT archive,
http://jurist.org/jurist search.php?q-pirates (search "pirates" within the query box in
the upper-right corner). On Feb. 1, 2012, a group of suspected pirates caught by a
Royal Navy operation in the Indian Ocean were brought to justice in the Seychelles.
RFA Fort Victoria disembarks pirates for prosecution in the Seychelles, MARITIME
SECURITY ASIA (Feb. 1, 2012), http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/rfa-fort-
victoria-disembarks-pirates-for-prosecution-in-the-seychelles/. A Royal Fleet Aux-
iliary (RFA) vessel Fort Victoria - part of NATO's counter-piracy task force
Operation OCEAN SHIELD handed over the suspected pirates to the Seychelles
authorities for prosecution.
125 Somalia Criticizes US for putting pirate on trial, BBC NEWS, May 19, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 10126248.
126 5 Somalis Guilty of Attack on U.S. Ship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/africa/25pirates.html.
127 Steve Szkotak, Attorneys Want Somalis' Piracy Convictions Tossed, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2013821397
apusprosecutingpirates.html.
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merchant vessel, the MV/CEC Future, in November 2008.128
Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, a 21 year old Somali, plead guilty in
May 2010 to hostage-taking and conspiracy in the hijacking of the
Maersk Alabama in the Indian Ocean in April 2009; on Wednesday,
February 16, 2011, he was sentenced to 33 years, 9 months
imprisonment in U.S. Federal District Court in Manhattan, NY. 129 On
May 23, 2011, two Somali men plead guilty to charges of piracy for
their role in hijacking a yacht, which resulted in the deaths of four
Americans. The guilty pleas by Jilani Abdiali and Burhan
Abdirahman Yusuf join those entered by Mohamud Hirs Issa Ali,
Mohamud Salad Ali and Ali Abdi Mohamed in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.13 0
As announced by the U.S. Attorney in the Muse (Maersk
Alabama) case noted above, the U.S. Department of State's official
position on such prosecutions has become that "the United States
believes that the first option for prosecution of a piracy incident
should be by the affected state(s) - the flag state or the state of
nationality of the vessel's owner or crew." 131 This is part of a
128 Megan McKee, Federal Judge Sentences Somali Pirate To 30 Years, JURIST
(November 28, 2010), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/11 /federal-judge-sentences-
somali-pirate-to-30-years.php. On the related matter of the guilty plea, see Press
Release, FBI Washington Field Office, Somali Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to
Commit Piracy in Takeover of Merchant Ship (Sept. 8, 2010), http:/www.
fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2010/wfo090810.htm. By way of contrast, A
Malaysian court on Feb. 11, 2011 charged seven suspected Somali pirates for firing
at Malaysian forces during a Gulf of Aden raid to free a hijacked tanker, under laws
that carry the death penalty. Somalia "Pirates" Charged In Malaysia, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12430671.
129 Chad Bray, Somali Man Sentenced to More Than 33 Years in Hi1acking
of Ships, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748703373404576148393224867726.html.
130 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of Virginia, Two More
Somalis Plead Guilty to Charges Relating to Piracy of Quest (May 23, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2011/05/20110523abdialinr.html. The U.S.
Attorney's Office reports that sentencing is scheduled for August 22, 2011 for Yusuf
and September 6, 2011 for Abdiali. Both are expected to receive sentences of life in
prison. Under the plea agreement, however, they could serve less time and
eventually be deported to Somalia. There were 14 suspects indicted in connection
with the attack, and others are expected to plead guilty in the near future. Id
131 United States Actions To Counter Piracy Off the Horn of Africa, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/128540.htm.
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coordinated strategy by which the U.S. "continues to urge states to
ensure that they have the proper domestic legal framework to
prosecute suspected pirates in their national courts."132 For example,
in the instance of Kenya, an affected state which may continue to be
unable to prosecute suspected offenders captured by the United
States, the United States has a Memorandum of Understanding "to
facilitate the transfer of the suspected pirates to Kenya for
prosecution in [the Kenyan] courts" and the U.S. States is "exploring
similar arrangements with other states to handle cases when affected
states are unable to prosecute pirates."133
The increasing intensity of patrolling pirate infested waters
around the globe, including but not limited to Somalia, will likely
lead to continued successful capturing of pirates or sea-robbers to be
brought to formal trial.134 The challenge then arises as to where these
pirates should be prosecuted. Alternatives include either domestic
prosecution under the laws criminalizing acts of piracy (or other
available U.S. criminal statutes) in U.S. Federal District Court (or
other competent U.S. court then extant or yet-to-be created), or
rendition back to the state of citizenship or regional partner states, or
rendition to the ICC. Professor Milena Sterio has noted that rendition
of pirates to the ICC would be viewed, at a minimum, as executive
recognition of the ICC by the U.S. -a politically undesirable result -
in the event it ever transfers captured pirates to so-called regional
132 id
13" 3id.
134 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Navy 5th Fleet Public Affairs, USS Ashland
Captures Pirates (Apr. 10, 2010), http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?storyid=
52519. This is in contrast to other acts of piracy which have been brought before
U.S. courts. See, e.g, United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008). Born
in Houston and a resident of Northern Virginia, Ali was charged with conspiracy to
assassinate the president, providing material support to al Qaeda, conspiracy to
commit aircraft piracy, and other associated crimes. The jury trial took place in
November 2005. On November 22, 2005, after deliberating for two and a half days,
the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on all counts. On March 29, 2006, Ali
was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his crime. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction but overturned the sentence
on the grounds that the prior Court had deviated from federal sentencing guidelines,
which call for life in prison. Judge Lee resentenced Ali to life in prison. Id.
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partner states, emulating what the U.K. does, for instance, with
transfer to Kenya for prosecution. 135 Under UNCLOS, Sterio notes,
[Tihe legality of this type of transfer is dubious, as
only the capturing state has jurisdiction over caught
pirates, and receiving states, like Kenya, do not.
Moreover, domestic statutes implementing UNCLOS
do not always allow for universal jurisdiction. The
U.S. statute that implemented UNCLOS allows the
U.S. to prosecute pirates, although the U.S. is the
capturing nation and has jurisdiction to prosecute
under UNCLOS, only if pirates somehow acted
against American interests. 136
This dilemma has arisen as a result of provisions stated by the
UNCLOS, which has posed enough problems on securing jurisdiction
over suspected pirates that the U.N. Security Council attempted to
address them through further new provisions in 2009. These
provisions adopted resolutions that would confer maritime powers
not granted in UNCLOS to member states in order to allow them to
conduct antipiracy operations in Somali waters and to facilitate the
prosecution of suspected pirates.137 Herein the resolutions bypass
current UNCLOS provisions because of the higher power conferred
upon the United Nations Security Council when it "acts in the
interest of international peace and security." 38 Although this
expands jurisdictional power over pirates and fills some of the gaps
left by the SUA, it does not solve all state sovereignty issues, but
rather it imposes limited, if any, obligations on states to delegate
1 Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is
Needed, BERKELEY ELEC. PRESS 14 (2009), http://works.bepress.com/milena
sterio/4; see also Kontorovich, supra note 26.
36Id.
137 Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime Piracy and International Law, CRIMES OF
WAR PROJECT, http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/maritime-piracy-and-
international-law/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
h8 Joseph M. Isanga, Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea Piracy: Expanding
Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267, 1294 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 7).
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authority over pirates, and should be further revised to enhance
prosecutorial powers.
Towards that end, the U.N. Security Council decided to
urgently consider the establishment of specialized Somali courts to
try suspected pirates both in Somalia and in the region, including an
"extraterritorial Somali specialized anti-piracy court" by adopting
resolution 1976 (2011) on April 11, 2011.139 Reports indicate that the
unrecognized independent region of Somaliland has opened a
maximum security prison for pirates in August 2011,140 yet piracy
trials cannot be held in Somalia because the country has lacked a
functioning legal system since the ouster of Mohamed SiadBarre in
1991.141 The prison, refurbished by a USD $1.5 million grant from the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),142 is currently only
housing prisoners tried in Somalia,143 a currently seeming
impossibility. The UNODC has also announced in May 2010 that
Seychelles was to create a UN-supported center to accept and try
pirates captured by the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU
NAVFOR) off the coast of Somalia and surrounding areas.144 "The
UNODC also indicated that future prisons may be opened in
Puntland as well as several more in Somaliland."145
h9 S.C. Res. 1976, 26, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1976 (Apr. 11, 2011).
140 Sarah McGregor, Somaliland Opens Pirate Prison, SOMALILAND PRESS(Mar. 29,
2011), http://somalilandpress.com/somaliland-opens-pirate-prison-2-2 1314.
141 id
142 Press Release, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNODC Open
Somaliland's First Prison in 50 Years to Further Tackle Piracy Scourge, (Mar. 29,
2011) http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2011 /March/unodc-open-
somalilands-first-prison-in-50-years-to-further-tackle-piracy-scourge.html.
143 McGregor, supra note 140.
144 Press Release, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Seychelles To
Establish Centre For Piracy Trials, (May 11, 2010), http://www.unodc.org/
southerncone/en/frontpage/2010/05/11-ilhas-seychelles-estudam-criar-uma-corte-
especifica-para-atos-de-pirataria.html. Towards that end, the EU NAVFOR has
sought out some unique "bona fide occupational qualifications" in its recent
advertisement for, amongst other professionals, a "Pirate Cultural Advisor." See
Somalia: Career Vacancy - Pirate Cultural Advisor, ALLAFRICA.COM (Aug. 11,
2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201108120118.html.
145 Julia Zebley, Somaliland Opens Maximum Security Prison for Pirates, JURIST
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/03/somaliland-opens-maximum-
security-prison-for-pirates.php.
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In Sunil Agarwal's estimate, these territorial and extra-
territorial tribunals are at best a "practical and concrete, albeit half-
step, towards developing the effective prosecution mechanisms to
combat Somali piracy."146 The resolution Agarwal discusses,
sponsored by Russia, calls for the creation of piracy courts outside of
Somalia and cooperation among countries in combating the piracy
problem.147 Russian Ambassador to the U.N., Vitaly Churkin, stated
that the resolution was the "first practical step in the direction of
creating an effective judicial mechanism, one capable of a credible,
reliable solution to the problem of bringing pirates to justice."148
Ambassador Churkin further asserted:
The worsening situation with piracy off the coast of
Somalia requires the international community to
adopt qualitatively new measures to combat it. Today
we've taken a big step ahead in fighting piracy. The
resolution adopted upon our initiative contains a
wide array of qualitatively new measures aimed at
establishing the necessary conditions for more
effectively counteracting the pirates. 149
So, given the ambiguity and the lack of cohesion of
international standards, what is possible through existent, as well as
"qualitatively new" measures under domestic (U.S.) criminal law,
and the laws of other nations that are capable (and willing) to
prosecute pirates? One answer is prosecution under laws sanctioning
terrorism. For instance, the U.S. Code contains a definition of
terrorism-to include maritime activities -embedded in its
requirement that Annual Country reports on Terrorism be submitted
146 Sunil Kumar Agarwal, Resolution 1976(2011) on Somali Piracy: Towards
Developing Prosecution Mechanisms to Combat Piracy 3 (Nat'l Mar. Found.,
Working Paper Series, May 25, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract 1873866.
147 Michael Haggerson, UN Security Council to Consider Special Maritime Piracy
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by the Secretary of State to Congress every year. According to Title
22, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d):
(d) Definitions
As used in this section-
(1) the term "international terrorism" means
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of
more than 1 country;
(2) the term "terrorism" means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents;
(3) the term "terrorist group" means any group,
or which has significant subgroups which
practice, international terrorism;
(4) the terms "territory" and "territory of the
country" mean the land, waters, and airspace
of the country; and
(5) the terms "terrorist sanctuary" and
"sanctuary" mean an area in the territory of
the country -
(A) that is used by a terrorist or terrorist
organization-
(i) to carry out terrorist activities,
including training, fundraising,
financing, and recruitment; or
(ii) as a transit point; and
(B) the government of which expressly
consents to, or with knowledge, allows,
tolerates, or disregards such use of its
territory and is not subject to a
determination under -
(i) section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix
to title 50;
(ii) section 2371(a) of this title; or
(iii) section 2780(d) of this title.150
"o 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2010).
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As for domestic prosecution, Title 18 of the U.S. Code,
Chapter 113B, Section 2332b(g)(5) sets forth the "Federal crime of
terrorism" as an offense that:
(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to
retaliate against government conduct; and
(B) is a violation of [any one of several dozen sections
of Titles 18, 42, or 49].151
IV. FROM PIRATE TO PROSECUTED CRIMINAL:
POLITICAL CAPITAL AND RESOURCES BROUGHT TO BEAR
Practical challenges attendant to bringing captured pirates to
trial prove most daunting. In addition to basic issues of criminal
jurisdiction, any criminal prosecution of pirates also involves
significant political and resource commitments. These commitments
include witness travel costs, visas, evidence preservation, and any
attendant diplomatic questions involving rendition or extradition.
Costs associated with even a simple criminal prosecution could easily
exceed millions of dollars. Obviously because of these limitations,
when U.S. or other coalition maritime forces actually intervene to
stop observed armed attacks on private vessels, they immediately
cease fire and passively standoff once pirate vessels break contact
with their intended targets.152 As recently as 2008, the British Foreign
Office advised the Royal Navy to avoid detaining pirates of certain
nationalities in view of the possibility that pirates may actually
invoke clams for asylum under British law if their country of origin is
known to use torture or allow execution as judicial punishment.153
Charles Glass wrote of the sentiments of International Maritime
Bureau Captain Pottengal Mukundun: "there are hardly any cases
... 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2010).
152 See, e.g., Coalition Maritime Forces Deter Pirate Attack off Yemen, NAVY
NEWSSTAND (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/
2004/12/mil-041215-nns03.htm.
15 Marie Woolf, Pirates can Claim UK Asylum, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008,
at 1, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.ul/sto/public/sitesearch.do?querystring=Pirates+
can+Claim+UK+Asylum&sectionld=2&p sto&bl on&pf all.
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where these attackers are arrested and brought to trial. Piracy is a
high-profit, low-risk activity." 54
Illustrative of this high-profit, low-risk paradigm is the 1999
incident involving the Indian Navy's recapture of the merchant
vessel Alondra Rainbow. Upon re-capture, it was determined that the
vessel was owned by a Japanese corporation, flagged in Panama, and
crewed largely by Filipinos.15 5 While the initial pirate attack and
seizure occurred off Indonesia, the ship also traversed the Sri Lankan
coastline before being disabled by gunfire in Indian waters. Because
of the multiple legal interests, nationalities, and obligations under
domestic and international law, the first piracy prosecution in India's
history15 6 required the cooperation of the IMB, Sri Lanka, Indian
Justice and Marine Ministries, the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard,
the private insurers, and Japanese government. After several years of
delay, the pirate gang was finally brought to trial and prosecuted in
2003 under questionable provisions of India's pre-independence
Penal Code.157 Although the pirates were in fact found guilty, despite
the use of deadly force, casting adrift of crew, and attempted
scuttling, the trial court imposed sentences no greater than seven
years imprisonment. 158 Subsequently, despite the best efforts of the
Indian prosecutors, the prisoners were freed and deported to
Indonesia only two years after dismissal of the case by the Mumbai
High Court of Appeals. 159 As a result of this very complex litigation,
154 Charles Glass, New Piracy: Charles Glass on the High Seas, LONDON REV. OF
BOOKS, Dec.18, 2003, at 5, http://www.irb.co.uk/v25/n24/charles-glass/the-new-
piracy.
1 See Michael Richardson, Challenging Marauders' Spread, Navy Recovers A
Hijacked Ship: India and China Set Sights On Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/23/news/23iht-pirates.2.t.html.





159 RS Vasan, Alondra Rainbow Revisited: A Study of Related Issues in the Light of
the Recent Judgment of Mumbai High Court, Paper No. 1379, S. ASIA ANALYSIS
GRP. (May 13, 2005), http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%/o5Cpapersl40%o5Cpaper
1379.html. With regards to future Indian prosecutions, the U.S. welcomed India's
decision to chair a plenary of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
in 2012. See India, U.S. ask Pakistan to expedite prosecution of 26/11 conspirators,
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and the growing reality of piracy threats to Indian maritime interests,
the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to work with
Parliament at the time of this article's writing to draft a new "bill
[that] seeks to define piracy, the people who can be termed as pirates,
the courts of law which would be trying these pirates and the
quantum of punishment to be given to the apprehended sea
brigands."160 Until laws and courts exist to expedite piracy
prosecutions, India's official stance towards piracy prosecutions is
"inclined to support the establishment of a special chamber within
the national jurisdiction of a State or States in the region, with UN
participation [since this] option is considered suitable besides being
cost effective, as it would strengthen the existing jurisdiction with the
established procedures[.]" 161
In an earlier piracy incident, complicated by third-party
nation interference bordering on complicity, we can study the 1998
case of the Petro Ranger, an oil tanker registered in Singapore that was
hijacked off the coast of Malaysia.162 The pirates re-painted and
renamed the ship the Wilby and flew Honduran colors.163 Following
an IMB Piracy Alert, the ship was identified, detained, and escorted
to the port of Hankou by the Chinese Coast Guard.164 Although
Chinese authorities did release the ship to its original owners, they
retained about half the total fuel on board as "evidence."1 65 Also,
perhaps to avoid questions about collusion by port authorities, the
pirates themselves were arrested, confined for a year but released
without prosecution, and returned to Indonesia despite a formal
request for extradition by Singapore. 166
NET INDIAN NEWS NETWORK (July 19, 2011), http://netindian.in/news/2011/07/
19/ 00014320/india-us-ask-pakistan-expedite-prosecution-26 11-conspirators.









166 Glass, supra note 154, at 4.
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Coastal states also understandably resist the deployment of
foreign warships in or even near territorial waters. Indonesia in
particular has a long history of sensitivity to the transit of foreign
military vessels through seas that they consider to be an "imagined
bridge" between nations, 167 such as the Malacca strait and other
important navigable waters. Littoral states are also quite sensitive to
interdictions or inspections by warships of another state, even if to
rescue hostages or recover stolen property.168
Under UNCLOS and long-standing customary international
law, the high seas are not subject to the sovereignty of any state. In
this respect, all actions on the high seas must be exercised with
scrupulous regard to the rights of other states in the exercise of their
sovereign vessels and citizens thereon. Except by special convention,
or in time of war, interference by a military vessel with a commercial
vessel engaged in lawful transit on the high seas is unlawful and
violates the sovereignty of the flag state of the vessel in question.169
Even when pirates are engaged by military or coastal vessels in
international waters, under 11(3) of UNCLOS, there is no right of hot
pursuit when pirates enter the territorial waters of another state
allowing an easy escape.170 UNCLOS does preserve the right of states
to suppress piracy and prosecute piracy in international waters171
but, unlike previous customary law, Article 107 of UNCLOS strictly
limits anti-piracy activities to "warships or military aircraft." 172
Conversely, whenever a foreign warship is lawfully within the
internal waters of another state (i.e. by invitation or innocent
passage), the ship retains sovereign immunity from local jurisdiction
within the reserved exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.173
167 Dedi Supriadi Adhuri, Does the Sea Divide or Unite Indonesians? Ethnicity and
Regionalism from a Maritime Perspective 4 (Res. Mgmt. in Asia-Pacific Program,
Working Paper No. 48, 2003), https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/
40995/3/rmap wp48.pdf.
168 See id
169 Owners of the Jessie, the Thomas F. Bayard and the Pescawha (Gr. Brit.) v.
United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 57, 58 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1921).
70 UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 111.
1 Id. at art. 105.
172 Id. at art. 107.
173 Id. at art. 32; see also GILBERT CHARLES GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC DE LA MER236 (Topos Verlag ed., 1932).
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Warships may not be boarded, detained, or searched.174 The only
lawful non-belligerent sanctions available to a coastal state regarding
the conduct of a foreign warship are diplomatic protest or expulsion
from territorial waters.175 Although commercial interests (and France)
have repeatedly proposed the creation of multinational maritime
forces under UN control to deal with pirates, these proposals are
usually rejected immediately by both Malaysia and Indonesia.176
Professor John Mo has identified that a strong complicating factor in
this cooperation happens to be the unsettled territorial claims among
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Brunei, and naval patrols in the South China Sea, involving the
Spratly Islands (Nasha Islands), the Pratas archipelago (Dongsha
Islands), the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands), and Paracel
Islands (Xisha Islands).1 77 At the same time, Mo claims that the
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries and China fear Japan's enforcement activities in deterring
piracy as "re-emerging Japanese militarism." 178
V. PRESCRIPTION BEFORE PROSECUTION: PREVENTING FAILING OR
FAILED STATES FROM BECOMING FULFILLED PIRATOCRACIES 179
Donna Nincic's research has indicated, "being a failed state
(at least as measured by the Failed State Index) is a necessary, though
174 See UNCLOS, supra note 64, at art. 32.
1 Id. at art. 30.
See generally John Mo, Options to Combat Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia, 33
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 343, 350-52 (2002).
177 Id at 350.
178 Id. at 351. For commentary on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
cooperative efforts, see ASEAN.oRG, http://www.asean.org/ (last visited Mar. 3,
2012). Five original Member Countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand) formed the ASEAN on Aug. 8, 1967 in Bangkok; the
Brunei Darussalam joined on Jan. 8, 1984, Vietnam on July 28, 1995, Lao PDR and
Myanmar on July 23,1997, and Cambodia on April 30 1999. Id
179 For a discussion of "piratocracy," see, e.g., Edward Countryman, Stability and
Class, Theory and History: The South in the Eighteenth Century, 17 J. AM. STUD.
243, 243-50 (1983) (reviewing RHlYs ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA
(1982); JEROME J. NADELHAFT, THE DISORDERS OF WAR: THE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH
CAROLINA (1981); and A. ROGER EKIRCH, "POOR CAROLINA": POLITICS AND
SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA (1981)).
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not sufficient condition for maritime piracy." 8 0 Nincic also found
precursor conditions to piracy which include presence "in an area
where merchant shipping concentrates; either in the vicinity of a
major sea-lane of communication, or important hub ports."181 Finally,
she found that maritime piracy is "more likely to occur when the
state has lost some control over the legitimate means of violence in
society; i.e., where armed militias, para-military gangs and the like
are able to operate with near impunity." 182
The latter assertion is especially logical, since diminished,
pre-occupied, or corrupt naval and coastal forces are incapable of
stemming criminal acts at sea. Even the IMB acknowledged that only
the U.S. and other Western nations with modern navies seem capable
of controlling pirates in hotspots such as Indonesia, Somalia and
West Africa.183 In a remarkable case of strange bedfellows, in
November 2007, the U.S. Navy actually came to the direct assistance
of a North Korean cargo vessel MV Dai Hong Dan, which had been
attacked and subsequently boarded by pirates of Somalia.184 In
another intervention in April 2008, French special-operations forces
recaptured the luxury sailing yacht LePonant taken in the Red Sea.185
The hijackers, apparently acting with complete impunity sailed the
vessel into the Somali port of Eyl from which they demanded a large
ransom to free the crew.186 In an ensuing rescue following delivery of
the ransom by the ships owners, six pirates were captured and taken
180 Nincic, supra note 35, at 30; see also The Failed States Index 2010, FOREIGN
POLICY (November 7, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/
21/2010 failed states index interactive mapand rankings (The so-called "Failed
States Index," drawn up by the Foreign Policy and TheFund for Peace, use
"indicators of risk and is based on thousands of articles and reports . . . from
electronically available sources.").
181 Nincic, supra note 35, at 30.
182 Id.
183 Lauren Ploch et al., supra note 71, at 30.
184 IS ship helps North Korea vessel crew overpower Somali pirates,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESS (Oct. 30, 2007), http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5hQLMIkR4kES5yt9Zfyy7YA8V1B8Q.
France: Pirates Captured, Hostages Freed, CBS NEWS (February 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/11 /world/main4009248.shtml.; Spiegel
Staff, Blackwater vs. Blackbeard Off the Coast of Africa, SALON (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.salon.com/2008/11/25/pirates 2/.
France: Pirates Captured, Hostages Freed, supra note 185.
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to France for prosecution.187 Eight other pirates were pursued and
killed on shore by attack helicopters as they attempted to escape.18 8
Yet even when authorities in one region increase pressure on
maritime criminals, piratical activity simply moves closer to shore,
towards areas with less enforcement activity, or increases in violence.
For example, when piratical activity decreased in Malaysia and
Bangladesh in 2007, attacks off Nigeria and Somalia tripled.189 In June
2007, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) requested "urgent
help" from Western navies to protect shipping off the Somali coast.190
After the U.S. called for a "Regional Maritime Security Initiative" in
2004, multilateral maritime security initiatives were introduced in the
Malacca Strait between 2004 and 2007.191 Since that time, in general,
the number of piracy incidents has been falling in the Malacca Strait
since 2005, "largely as a result of a number of countermeasures




189 See Reported Piracy Rise Sharply in 2007, INT'L MAR. BUREAU (January 8,
2008), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/148-reported-piracy-incidents-rise-sharply-in-
2007-.
190 UN Relief At French Help Against Somali Pirates, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS
(September 26, 2007), http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g8aw
97BGHluPtBQhnql d3drKCIMQ.
1 Catherine Zara Raymond, Piracy And Armed Robbery In The Malacca Strait -A
Problem Solved? 62 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV., 31, 35 (Summer 2009), available at
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7835607e-3 88c-4e70-bafl -b00e9fb443fl/
Piracy-and-Armed-Robbery-in-the-Malacca-Strait--A-. The IMO has lauded regional
anti-piracy operation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Piracy and armed
robbery against ships, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.
org/ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 3,
2012). The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), which concluded in November 2004 by
16 countries in Asia, and includes the RECAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC)
for facilitating the sharing of piracy-related information, is a good example of
successful regional cooperation which IMO seeks to replicate elsewhere."
192 Raymond, supra note 191, at 32.
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Emerging states, not just failed states, lag far behind the West
in port security and vessel identification systems. 193 Illustrative is the
recent saga of the An Yue Jiang, a Chinese merchant ship allegedly
carrying ammunition and small arms destined for landlocked
Zimbabwe. Upon discovering the nature of the cargo, a group of
southern African nations coordinated efforts to monitor that ship's
movements and prevent unloading of the cargo.194 After air and sea
patrols lost track of the vessel, the South African government
acknowledged their capacity to track and monitor vessels at sea was
essentially "non-existent." 195 The An Yue Jiang incident also
highlights a failure of compliance by non-Western coastal states with
amendments to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) relating to implementation of a unified long-
range identification and tracking system (LRIT) capable of
identifying merchant vessels over 300 tons displacement up to
1500km at sea.196
Another potential factor in increased predation is the general
prohibition on the use of small arms or weapons capable of deadly
force on commercial vessels for self-defense. Sea-going vessels
virtually never carry arms for self-defense.197 This situation is
primarily attributable to severe penal and customs laws against
weapons possession in almost all maritime states. Insurers and ships
owners also view the liability risk associated with armed defense as
exceeding the risk of loss of the vessel itself. Even were armed force a
viable option, increased technologies have resulted in much smaller
ships crews often out-numbered by potential borders. Merchant
sailors are not trained to use firearms and coordinating a ship's
defense with crews speaking three different languages also might
193 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-1155T, MARITIME SECURITY:
PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT, BUT
CONCERNS REMAIN (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031155t.pdf.
194 South Africa Lacks Maritime Security Skills, Systems says Qfficial, AFRICAN
PRESS INT'L (API) (May 18, 2008), http://africanpress.wordpress.com/2008/
05/18/south-africa-lacks-maritime-security-skills-systems-says-official/.
195
1 SOLAS, supra note 76.
197 Guns on-board: A "Real World" Look At the Issue of Carrying Firearms On
Your Vessel, MARITIME SECURITY, http://maritimesecurity.com/gunsonboard.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
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present obstacles to effective self-defense, even were it lawfully
authorized. Licensed, armed guards are available in some instances
but costs are high and logistics complicated. Furthermore, there may
be as much risk from un-vetted local security as from actual pirates.
To prevent attacks or boarding, ships captains rely upon
increased speed, maneuvering, water hoses, sound cannons or newer
passive systems such as electrified boarding nets, alarm systems, or
lubricant foams. 198 Most often, in order to protect the lives and safety
of their crews, shipping companies usually request naval forces to
stand-off while they negotiate for weeks or even months with pirate
hostage-takers. In November 2007, the U.S. Navy actually served as
intermediary between a group of particularly violent Somali pirates
and owners of the Ching Fong Hwa 168, a Taiwanese fishing vessel.
"We continue to talk with the pirates regularly, encouraging them to
leave ships," noted a Navy spokesperson from 5th Fleet Headquarters
in Bahrain.199
So-called Private Security Companies (PSCs), also known as
Private Military Firms (PMFs), usually headquartered in Europe or
the U.S. also offer anti-piracy consulting and other services. There are
however significant gaps between what PSCs may claim in marketing
materials as opposed to the actual end services they are capable of
providing. Most legitimate PSCs limit services to deterrence or
vigilance training, background checks, hostage negotiations, recovery
investigations, or general risk assessment.200 Employment of armed
guards on merchant ships, or the use of private armed escort vessels
is exceedingly rare. Privately employed and armed security
personnel face substantial risks of arrest and detention as
mercenaries or even terrorists, especially in Asian waters, and face
opposition by the U.N. over concerns of accountability and effi-
See, e.g., gCaptain Staff, Anti-Piracy Weapons - Top 10 For Future Use In
Somalia, GCAPTAIN (September 29, 2008), http://gcaptain.com/anti-pirate-weapons-
piracy-somalia?2873.
199 Survivors of Somali Pirate Attack Tell of Months Qf Horror At Sea, BOSTON
HERALD, November 15, 2007, http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?
articleid=I 044962&format-text.
200 Carlyn Liss, Private Security Companies in the Fight Against Piracy in Asia 1-3
(Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 120, June 2005), http://www.
humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?Recordld=12808.
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cacy.201 Desperate ships owners have proposed the creation of small
multinational military forces under license from the United Nations.
Meanwhile, a robust multinational task force for military counter-
piracy operations under the auspices of two Combined Task Forces
(CTFs), CTF-150 and 151, conduct Maritime Security Operations
(MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea
and the Indian Ocean, with regular rotation of command over these
CTFs among partner navies, and augmentation with Special
Operations Forces as required.202
201 Id. at 6-7. In the Spring of 2011, the northern Somali region of Puntland has
suspended a deal with the South African mercenary firm Saracen International "after
close consultation with the U.N.," and the de-facto Somali government canceled a
similar contract with Saracen in January. See Somalia: Puntland Drops Deal With
Mercenary Firm, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/
18/world/africa/I 8briefs-ART-Somalia.html? r=1 &ref-privatemilitarycompanies.
By way of contrast and at nearly the same time, Bancroft Global Development is an
American private security company that the U.S. State Department has indirectly
financed to train African troops fighting "a pitched urban battle ... against the
Shabab, the Somali militant group allied with Al Qaeda." Jeffrey Gettleman, Mark
Mazzetti& Eric Schmitt, U.S. Relies on Contractors in Somali Conflict, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/1lsomalia.html?
ref-privatemilitarycompanies. For an analysis of the roles, relationships, and real
problems of Private Military Firm /Private Military Company employment and
deployment; see also Kevin Govern & Eric Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military
Firms: International Law Misses Its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 55
(2008).
202 Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, http:/www.
cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/150/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). Countries presently
contributing to CTF-150 include Republic of Korea, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Pakistan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other
nations who have participated include Australia, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Turkey. CTF 151 is a multinational task force
established in January 2009 to conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-
based mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) area of
responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global
maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.
CTF 151 has been commanded by the U.S. Navy, the Korean Navy and the Turkish
Navy. See Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES,
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). For one
of the most successful uses of Special Operations Forces in counter-
terrorism/counterpiracy operations, contemporaneous with the writing of this article,
see e.g. Ariel Zirulnick, SEAL Team 6: Somalia rescue illustrates new US military
strategy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.
2011 NATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO AN INTERNATIONAL SCOURGE 49
VI. POTENTIAL WAYS AHEAD IN PREVENTING AND CHALLENGING
PIRATICAL THREATS
In view of the complex nature of the maritime piracy, as well
as its demonstrated threat to national, regional, and international
security, effective confrontation requires global engagement; a
willingness to reach consensus-based integrated deterrence stra-
tegies, and an active prosecution regime. Amendments to SUA
should focus on more robust inspections of ships and crews, the
recognition of a limited right of "hot pursuit," and broadened
definitions of both piracy and maritime terrorism.203 Although
recently the SUA amended the definition of piracy, it did not extend
the scope of international jurisdiction. Accordingly, the United States
has repeatedly sought to amend SUA to allow warships automatic
permission to board foreign flagged vessels where the flag state fails
to respond to the requesting state's request within a certain number
of hours.204 An international ship's registration process must be
implemented in order to eliminate non-transparent convenience
flagging. Biometric credentials and passports could address the
current blight of fraudulent documentation. A United Nations
'Maritime Ombudsman' agency under IMO control or the United
Nations International Labor Office (ILO) could intervene when
requested to address concerns about detained crews or the lack of
due-process or transparency for those charged with maritime
criminal offenses.
Towards these important ends, the United States must move
forward and accept its responsibilities as (although not aspiring to
be) the world's only remaining super-power and leading maritime
state. This includes, inter alia, the ratification of UNCLOS and, with
reservations if necessary, the Rome Statute.205 UNCLOS and Rome
Statute ratification will also facilitate a leadership role for the United
States in negotiating multilateral instruments and more effective
com/World/terrorism-security/2012/0126/SEAL-Team-6-Somalia-rescue-illustrates-
new-US-military-strategy.
203 GRAHAM GERARD ONG-WEBB, "SHIPS CAN BE DANGEROUS Too": COUPLING
PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA'S MARITIME SECURITY
FRAMEWORK (2004), http://www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsil2004.pdf.
204 See Chatham House, supra note 105, at 1-2.
205 See generally, Rome Statute, supra note 113.
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international regimes that can address maritime terrorism, in
addition to the U.S.'s own efforts to apprehend pirates and prosecute
them under domestic U.S. laws. In the forefront there must be clear
and consistent domestic criminalization and extradition agreements
in accordance with the 2005 Protocols and SUA Convention. Taking
the diplomatic lead in this area would also facilitate the formation of
an effective multinational U.N. maritime force capable of clearing
sea-lanes of pirates, sea robbers, and terrorists. The United States'
vast intelligence capabilities and unique technologies, such as un-
manned reconnaissance aircraft (armed or un-armed), could provide
much needed leverage for a multinational force and greatly reducing
associated costs, especially in Africa where technical resources (and
political will) to effectuate needed changes are limited.
As noted, prosecution of extra-territorial piratical acts against
U.S.-flagged ships or involving U.S. citizens is possible under various
U.S. federal piracy or expansive anti-terrorism legislation.206 Also,
there are successful models of inter-agency and international
maritime cooperation. Specifically, Joint Interagency Task Forces
(JIATFs) involved in counter-drug interdiction operations have
worked directly with Central and South American states in the Gulf
of Mexico, South Atlantic, and Pacific since 1989.207 Based upon these
206 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8; 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (2010) (Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2010) (Assault on Federal
Officials); 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2010) (Assault on the high seas); 18 U.S.C. § 371
(2010) (Conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2010) (Use of explosive against property
used in foreign commerce of the United States or against any property used in an
activity affecting foreign commerce of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2010)
(Piracy on the high seas); 18 U.S.C. § 1659 (plundering a ship); 18 U.S.C. § 2111
(2010) (Robbery on high seas); 18 U.S.C. § 2280(a)(1)(A),(B), and/or (H) (2010)
(Maritime violence/hijacking of a ship); 18 U.S.C. § 2232 (2010) (Assaults on U.S.
nationals overseas); 18 U.S.C. § 2232a (2010) (Use of WMD against U.S. nationals
outside of the U.S.).
207See, e.g., Evan Munsing & Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force-
South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, INST. FOR NAT'L
STRATEGIC STUDIES (June 2011), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/
Strat%20Perspectives % 2 05%2 0 %20Lamb-Munsing.pdf ("Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-South) is well known within the U.S. Government as the "gold
standard" for interagency cooperation and intelligence fusion, despite its preference
for keeping a low profile and giving other agencies the credit for its successes. It is
often cited as a model for whole-of-government problem-solving in the literature on
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success models, similar counter-piracy arrangements with partners in
Asia and Africa could yield immediate and positive results,
especially if criminal jurisdiction issues can also be resolved.
Perhaps of equal importance, dealing with the piracy
problem in turn lessens the opportunities for pirates and terror
groups to leverage maritime crime and violence towards political
ends, especially with regards to the hijacking of weapons and items
which may be employed as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Any progress in this area also reduces the possibility for regional and
worldwide devastation. A 2006 RAND Center for Terrorism Risk
Management Policy report notes a so-called "dirty-bomb" explosion
from within an uninspected cargo container presents "the greatest
combination of likelihood and expected economic harm." 208 Ships
filled with explosives could also destroy densely populated urban
areas, critical infrastructures, or be scuttled in maritime choke points
such as the Malacca or Hormuz straits. Additionally, in regards to
WMD control, failed or weak states will face increasing economic and
diplomatic pressure to deal with their own criminal elements and
general lack of maritime transparency.
In May of 2003, the United States, along with ten coalition
partners, founded the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).209 That
number has now grown to eighteen with sixty others agreeing to
cooperate in interdiction strategies. 210 The PSI has no unique legal
authority; its interdiction principles state that all activities are to be
"consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international
interagency collaboration, and other national security organizations have tried to
copy its approach and successes.").
208 Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko & David S.
Ortiz, Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability, RAND CENTER FOR TERRORISM RISIK
MANAGEMENT 19 (2006), http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND MG520.
sum.pdf.
209 Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm [hereinafter PSI
Statement].
210 Id. Those other original member states include Australia, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Shie,
supra note 96, at 23 (noting the addition of Canada, Singapore, Norway, Denmark,
and Turkey in Dec. 2003, and the Czech Republic and Russia in 2004).
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law and frameworks." 211 The PSI seeks to "involve in some capacity
all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and
willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the
air, or on land."212 The PSI also "seeks cooperation from any state
whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might
be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern."213
The PSI's principal goals are:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in
concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer
or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials to and from states and non-state
actors of proliferation concern[;] ...
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of
relevant information concerning suspected prolifera-
tion activity, protecting the confidential character of
classified information provided by other states as part
of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and
efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and
maximize coordination among participants in
interdiction efforts[;]
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant
national legal authorities where necessary to accom-
plish these objectives, and work to strengthen when
necessary relevant international laws and frameworks
in appropriate ways to support these commitments[;]
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts
regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or
related materials, to the extent their national legal
authorities permit and consistent with their obli-
gations under international law and frameworks[.]214
211 Eben Kaplan, The Proliferation Security Initiative, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Oct. 19, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 11057/.
212 PSI Statement, supra note 209.
213 PSI Statement, supra note 209.
214 id
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Successful PSI cooperation has included not only plenary
sessions and maritime training exercises, 215 but also at least one
mission conducted by PSI nations in October 2003.216 Eben Kaplan of
the Council on Foreign Relations credited the PSI (along with other
groups investigating proliferation) for intercepting the German-
owned BBC China, because it diverted the ship to the port of Taranto,
Italy from its voyage from Dubai to Libya.217 The BBC China was
found to be carrying nuclear centrifuge parts for Libya's nascent
nuclear program. 218 Kaplan noted that "[tihe seizure helped unravel
the Khan network and was a major factor in negotiating the forfeiture
of Libya's WMD programs." 219
Robert G. Joseph, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, exhorted the assembled PSI
nations at a June 2006 PSI meeting to:
First: Think innovatively. Undertake a review of your
laws and how they can be strengthened to deny the
proliferation of WMD and missile-related shipments
and services that support proliferation from or
through your states;
Second: Enforce aggressively. Develop a regularized
interagency mechanism in your government to
review enforcement data and share information on
possible interdictions of shipments, personnel, funds,
and other services that aid in proliferation; and
215 Shie, supra note 96, at 17.
216 Kaplan, supra note 211.
217 id.
218 id
219 Id (Note that the "Khan Network" is not to be confused with the "Aga Khan
Development Network" (AKDN) that was and is a group of development agencies
with mandates ranging from health and education to architecture, culture, and other
endeavors. This quote refers to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father" of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons and deterrence program, who then established an administrative
proliferation network weapons allegedly to North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya.).
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Third: Engage regularly. Commit to active outreach
and to host and participate in PSI exercises in your
region and beyond.220
Not by might alone, but also by the "power of the purse,"
Joseph described how PSI members and all those nations pursuing
counter proliferation might develop "tools to interdict payments
between proliferators and their suppliers."221 For instance, U.S.
Executive Order 13382222 aims to "freez[e] the assets of proliferators
of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and isolat[e]
them financially[," so that "[d]esignations under E.O. 13382 prohibit
all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and
freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction."223
VII. CONCLUSION
As piracy has evolved, modern threats have required modern
approaches. There still exists an abiding calculus of right and might
used since time immemorial to combat piracy. Future approaches to
preventing and combating piracy will, as always, require the
sword - competent military forces to protect both maritime bound-
aries and prevent smuggling and piracy -in addition to the power of
the pen-laws and policies concluded and enforced by competent
governments. 224 The maritime community has increased its
220 Robert G. Joseph, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., Dep't of State,
Address at PSI's Third Anniversary Meeting in Krakow, Poland (June 23, 2006),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/68269.htm.
221 Id (Joseph noted how the U.S. had put in place a "new Executive Order, which
prohibits U.S. persons from doing business with entities designated because of their
proliferation activities.").
222 Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their
Supporters, Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R. 13382 (June 28, 2005).
223 Executive Order 13382, DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c22080.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
224 See, e.g., Navy is India's Sword and Shield at Sea, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE
(Aug. 17, 2004), http://www.ipcs.org/pdf file/news archive/aug 04 militarynavy.
pdf. The authors also assert that competent air and land forces can and will be
required to operate in joint (multiple branches of military service), combined
(multinational) and interagency (multiple departments of the executive branch)
operations. Id
54 V. 19
2011 NATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO AN INTERNATIONAL SCOURGE 55
awareness of this situation, but the international legal community, as
a whole, is in disarray with respect to effective and contemporary
sets of laws and rules. Maritime incidents have changed the
complexion of the situation and gaps in efforts to restrain maritime
acts of violence have been exposed.
A solution to the continuing challenge of applying
international laws to both international and national problems of
piracy and maritime terrorism must also address the disparities in
capabilities which remain between the nations with established and
competent navies and littoral nations. Significant gaps that remain
both in maritime law and international jurisdiction will have to be
amended by new legislation, improvement in the provisions of
maritime conventions, and in the future, domestication of
criminalizing piracy to more effectively combat this age old problem.
Because nations with modern navies have capabilities of
controlling piracy, while emerging nations and failed states struggle
to contain violence, the U.S. can employ a full range of sophisticated
technologies, multidisciplinary capabilities, as well as overwhelming
force to "overmatch" piratical threats. The U.S. judicial system has
proven experience in effectively and swiftly applying domestic (if not
international) laws to try cases of terrorism and piracy in all forms.
Wherever possible, looking beyond national shores and maritime
zones, the U.S. and other nations afflicted by maritime piracy,
criminality, and terrorist activities must also act in bilateral/
multilateral capacities to prevent future conflicts and piracy
challenges. Towards those ends, there is much merit to extending
current international agreements, and implementing effective powers
to prosecute maritime criminals under present and future
international conventions. This focus on expanding the
responsibilities and the rights of maritime nations to freedom of
navigation will decrease rogue power and momentum, if not
eliminating this international scourge of piracy entirely.

